

## **NATIONWIDE FUND ADVISORS**

### **SUMMARY OF PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES**

#### **GENERAL**

The Board of Trustees of Nationwide Mutual Funds and Nationwide Variable Insurance Trust (the “Funds”) has approved the continued delegation of the authority to vote proxies relating to the securities held in the portfolios of the Funds to each Fund’s investment adviser or sub-adviser, as the case may be, after the Board reviewed and considered the proxy voting policies and procedures used by each of the investment advisers and sub-advisers of the Funds, some of which advisers and sub-advisers use an independent service provider, as described below.

Nationwide Fund Advisors (“NFA” or the “Adviser”), is an investment adviser that is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”). NFA currently provides investment advisory services to registered investment companies (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Clients”).

Voting proxies that are received in connection with underlying portfolio securities held by Clients is an important element of the portfolio management services that NFA performs for Clients. NFA’s goal in performing this service is to make proxy voting decisions: (i) to vote or not to vote proxies in a manner that serves the best economic interests of Clients; and (ii) that avoid the influence of conflicts of interest. To implement this goal, NFA has adopted proxy voting guidelines (the “Proxy Voting Guidelines”) to assist it in making proxy voting decisions and in developing procedures for effecting those decisions. The Proxy Voting Guidelines are designed to ensure that, where NFA has the authority to vote proxies, all legal, fiduciary, and contractual obligations will be met.

The Proxy Voting Guidelines address a wide variety of individual topics, including, among other matters, shareholder voting rights, anti-takeover defenses, board structures and the election of directors, executive and director compensation, reorganizations, mergers, and various shareholder proposals.

The proxy voting records of the Funds are available to shareholders on the Trust’s website, [www.nationwide.com/mutualfunds](http://www.nationwide.com/mutualfunds), and the SEC’s website.

#### **HOW PROXIES ARE VOTED**

NFA has delegated to RiskMetrics Group ISS Governance Services (“RiskMetrics”), an independent service provider, the administration of proxy voting for Client portfolio securities directly managed by NFA, subject to oversight by NFA’s “Proxy Voting Committee.” Risk Metrics, a Delaware corporation, provides proxy-voting services to many asset managers on a global basis. The NFA Proxy Voting Committee has reviewed, and will continue to review annually, the relationship with Risk Metrics and the quality and effectiveness of the various services provided by Risk Metrics.

Specifically, Risk Metrics assists NFA in the proxy voting and corporate governance oversight process by developing and updating the “Risk Metrics Proxy Voting Guidelines,” which are incorporated into the Proxy Voting Guidelines, and by providing research and analysis, recommendations regarding votes, operational implementation, and recordkeeping and reporting services. NFA’s decision to retain Risk Metrics is based principally on the view that the services that Risk Metrics provides, subject to oversight by NFA, generally will result in proxy voting decisions which serve the best economic interests of Clients. NFA has reviewed, analyzed, and determined that the Risk Metrics Proxy Voting Guidelines are consistent with the views of NFA on the various types of proxy proposals. When the Risk Metrics Proxy Voting Guidelines do not cover a specific proxy issue and Risk Metrics does not provide a recommendation: (i) Risk Metrics will notify NFA; and (ii) NFA will use its best judgment in voting proxies on behalf of the Clients. A summary of the Risk Metrics Proxy Voting Guidelines is set forth below.

#### **CONFLICTS OF INTEREST**

NFA does not engage in investment banking, administration or management of corporate retirement plans, or any other activity that is likely to create a potential conflict of interest. In addition, because Client proxies are voted by Risk Metrics pursuant to the pre-determined Risk Metrics Proxy Voting Guidelines, NFA generally does not make an actual determination of how to vote a particular proxy, and, therefore, proxies voted on behalf of Clients do not reflect any conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the Proxy Voting Guidelines address the possibility of such a conflict of interest arising.

The Proxy Voting Guidelines provide that, if a proxy proposal were to create a conflict of interest between the interests of a Client and those of NFA (or between a Client and those of any of NFA’s affiliates, including Nationwide Fund Distributors LLC and Nationwide), then the proxy should be voted strictly in conformity with the recommendation of Risk Metrics. To monitor compliance with this policy, any proposed or actual deviation from a recommendation of Risk Metrics must be reported by the NFA Proxy Voting Committee to the chief counsel for NFA. The chief counsel for NFA then will provide guidance concerning the proposed deviation and whether a deviation presents any potential conflict of interest. If NFA then casts a proxy vote that deviates from a Risk Metrics recommendation, the affected Client (or other appropriate Client authority) will be given a report of this deviation.

## **CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH PROXIES WILL NOT BE VOTED**

NFA, through Risk Metrics, shall attempt to process every vote for all domestic and foreign proxies that they receive; however, there may be cases in which NFA will not process a proxy because it is impractical or too expensive to do so. For example, NFA will not process a proxy in connection with a foreign security if the cost of voting a foreign proxy outweighs the benefit of voting the foreign proxy, when NFA has not been given enough time to process the vote, or when a sell order for the foreign security is outstanding and proxy voting would impede the sale of the foreign security. Also, NFA generally will not seek to recall the securities on loan for the purpose of voting the securities -- *except*, in regard to a sub-advised Fund, for those proxy votes that a sub-adviser (retained to manage the sub-advised Fund and overseen by NFA) has determined could materially affect the security on loan. The Firm will seek to have the appropriate Sub-adviser(s) vote those proxies relating to securities on loan that are held by a Sub-advised Nationwide Fund that the Sub-adviser(s) has determined could materially affect the security on loan.

## **DELEGATION OF PROXY VOTING TO SUB-ADVISERS TO FUNDS**

For any Fund, or portion of a Fund that is directly managed by a sub-adviser, the Trustees of the Fund and NFA have delegated proxy voting authority to that sub-adviser. Each sub-adviser has provided its proxy voting policies to the Board of Trustees of the Fund and NFA for their respective review and these proxy voting policies are described below. Each sub-adviser is required (1) to represent quarterly to NFA that all proxies of the Fund(s) advised by the sub-adviser were voted in accordance with the sub-adviser's proxy voting policies as provided to NFA and (2) to confirm that there have been no material changes to the sub-adviser's proxy voting policies.

## **2011 RMG PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY**

The following is a concise summary of the proxy voting policy guidelines for 2011.

### **Routine/Miscellaneous**

#### **Auditor Ratification**

Vote FOR proposals to ratify auditors, unless any of the following apply:

- An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;
- There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company's financial position;
- Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures; or
- Fees for non-audit services ("Other" fees) are excessive.

Non-audit fees are excessive if:

- Non-audit ("other") fees > audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation fees

### **Board of Directors**

#### **Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections**

Votes on director nominees should be determined CASE-BY-CASE.

Four fundamental principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:

1. Board Accountability
2. Board Responsiveness
3. Director Independence
4. Director Competence

#### **1. Board Accountability**

VOTE WITHHOLD/AGAINST<sup>1</sup> the entire board of directors (except new nominees<sup>2</sup>, who should be considered CASE-BY-CASE), for the following:

#### ***Problematic Takeover Defenses:***

1.1. The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for election -- any or all appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable;

<sup>1</sup> In general, companies with a plurality vote standard use "Withhold" as the valid contrary vote option in director elections; companies with a majority vote standard use "Against". However, it will vary by company and the proxy must be checked to determine the valid contrary vote option for the particular company.

<sup>2</sup> A "new nominee" is any current nominee who has not already been elected by shareholders and who joined the board after the problematic action in question transpired. If ISS cannot determine whether the nominee joined the board before or after the problematic action transpired, the nominee will be considered a "new nominee" if he or she joined the board within the 12 months prior to the upcoming shareholder meeting.

1.2. The board lacks accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one- and three-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company's four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company's five-year total shareholder return and five-year operational metrics. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:

- A classified board structure;
- A supermajority vote requirement;
- Majority vote standard for director elections with no carve out for contested elections;
- The inability for shareholders to call special meetings;
- The inability for shareholders to act by written consent;
- A dual-class structure; and/or
- A non-shareholder approved poison pill.

1.3. The company's poison pill has a "dead-hand" or "modified dead-hand" feature. Vote withhold/against every year until this feature is removed;

1.4. The board adopts a poison pill with a term of more than 12 months ("long-term pill"), or renews any existing pill, including any "short-term" pill (12 months or less), without shareholder approval. A commitment or policy that puts a newly-adopted pill to a binding shareholder vote may potentially offset an adverse vote recommendation. Review such companies with classified boards every year, and such companies with annually-elected boards at least once every three years, and vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from all nominees if the company still maintains a non-shareholder-approved poison pill. This policy applies to all companies adopting or renewing pills after the announcement of this policy (Nov 19, 2009);

1.5. The board makes a material adverse change to an existing poison pill without shareholder approval.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on all nominees if:

1.6. the board adopts a poison pill with a term of 12 months or less ("short-term pill") without shareholder approval, taking into account the following factors:

- The date of the pill's adoption relative to the date of the next meeting of shareholders- i.e. whether the company had time to put the pill on ballot for shareholder ratification given the circumstances;
- The issuer's rationale;
- The issuer's governance structure and practices; and
- The issuer's track record of accountability to shareholders.

#### ***Problematic Audit-Related Practices***

Generally, vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from the members of the Audit Committee if:

1.7. The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive (see discussion under "Auditor Ratification");

1.8. The company receives an adverse opinion on the company's financial statements from its auditor; or

1.9. There is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on members of the Audit Committee and/or the full board if:

1.10. Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence and duration, as well as the company's efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether WITHHOLD/AGAINST votes are warranted.

#### ***Problematic Compensation Practices***

Vote WITHHOLD/AGAINST the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:

1.11. There is a negative correlation between chief executive pay and company performance (see Pay for Performance Policy);

1.12. The company reprices underwater options for stock, cash, or other consideration without prior shareholder approval, even if allowed in the company's equity plan;

1.13. The company fails to submit one-time transfers of stock options to a shareholder vote;

1.14. The company fails to fulfill the terms of a burn rate commitment made to shareholders;

1.15. The company has problematic pay practices. Problematic pay practices may warrant withholding votes from the CEO and potentially the entire board as well.

### **Governance Failures**

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, due to:

1.16. Material failures of governance, stewardship, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;

1.17. Failure to replace management as appropriate; or

1.18. Egregious actions related to the director(s)' service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

### **2. Board Responsiveness**

Vote WITHHOLD/AGAINST the entire board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered CASE-BY-CASE), if:

2.1. The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received approval by a majority of the shares outstanding the previous year; or

2.2. The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received approval of the majority of shares cast in the last year and one of the two previous years.

2.3. The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of the shareholders tendered their shares; or

2.4. At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote.

### **3. Director Independence**

Vote WITHHOLD/AGAINST Inside Directors and Affiliated Outside Directors (per the Categorization of Directors) when:

3.1. The inside or affiliated outside director serves on any of the three key committees: audit, compensation, or nominating;

3.2. The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee;

3.3. The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee; or

3.4. The full board is less than majority independent.

### **4. Director Competence**

VOTE WITHHOLD/AGAINST the entire board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered CASE-BY-CASE), if:

4.1. The company's proxy indicates that not all directors attended 75 percent of the aggregate board and committee meetings, but fails to provide the required disclosure of the names of the director(s) involved.

Generally vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from individual directors who:

4.2. Attend less than 75 percent of the board and committee meetings (with the exception of new nominees). Acceptable reasons for director(s) absences are generally limited to the following:

- Medical issues/illness;
- Family emergencies; and
- If the director's total service was three meetings or fewer and the director missed only one meeting.

These reasons for directors' absences will only be considered by ISS if disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. If the disclosure is insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of board and committee meetings in aggregate, vote AGAINST/WITHHOLD from the director.

Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from individual directors who:

4.3. Sit on more than six public company boards; or

4.4. Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own-- withhold only at their outside boards.

#### **Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors:

- Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry;
- Management's track record;
- Background to the proxy contest;
- Qualifications of director nominees (both slates);
- Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management;
- Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates);
- Stock ownership positions.

#### **Independent Chair (Separate Chair/CEO)**

Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals requiring that the chairman's position be filled by an independent director, unless the company satisfies *all* of the following criteria:

The company maintains the following counterbalancing governance structure:

- Designated lead director, elected by and from the independent board members with clearly delineated and comprehensive duties. (The role may alternatively reside with a presiding director, vice chairman, or rotating lead director; however the director must serve a minimum of one year in order to qualify as a lead director.) The duties should include, but are not limited to, the following:
  - presides at all meetings of the board at which the chairman is not present, including executive sessions of the independent directors;
  - serves as liaison between the chairman and the independent directors;
  - approves information sent to the board;
  - approves meeting agendas for the board;
  - approves meeting schedules to assure that there is sufficient time for discussion of all agenda items;
  - has the authority to call meetings of the independent directors;
  - if requested by major shareholders, ensures that he is available for consultation and direct communication;
- Two-thirds independent board;
- All independent key committees;
- Established governance guidelines;
- A company in the Russell 3000 universe must not have exhibited sustained poor total shareholder return (TSR) performance, defined as one- and three-year TSR in the bottom half of the company's four-digit GICS industry group (using Russell 3000 companies only), unless there has been a change in the Chairman/CEO position within that time. For companies not in the Russell 3000 universe, the company must not have underperformed both its peers and index on the basis of both one-year and three-year total shareholder returns, unless there has been a change in the Chairman/CEO position within that time;
- The company does not have any problematic governance or management issues, examples of which include, but are not limited to:
  - Egregious compensation practices;
  - Multiple related-party transactions or other issues putting director independence at risk;
  - Corporate and/or management scandals;
  - Excessive problematic corporate governance provisions; or
  - Flagrant actions by management or the board with potential or realized negative impacts on shareholders.

#### **Shareholder Rights & Defenses**

##### **Net Operating Loss (NOL) Protective Amendments**

Vote AGAINST proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company's net operating losses ("NOLs") if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

- The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing 5-percent holder);
- The value of the NOLs;
- Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);
- The company's existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
- Any other factors that may be applicable.

### **Poison Pills- Management Proposals to Ratify Poison Pill**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:

- No lower than a 20% trigger, flip-in or flip-over;
- A term of no more than three years;
- No dead-hand, slow-hand, no-hand or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;
- Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill.

In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company's existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.

### **Poison Pills- Management Proposals to Ratify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs)**

Vote AGAINST proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company's net operating losses ("NOLs") if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

- The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5 percent);
- The value of the NOLs;
- Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);
- The company's existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
- Any other factors that may be applicable.

### **Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent**

Generally vote AGAINST management and shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders' ability to act by written consent.

Generally vote FOR management and shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to act by written consent, taking into account the following factors:

- Shareholders' current right to act by written consent;
- The consent threshold;
- The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;
- Investor ownership structure; and
- Shareholder support of, and management's response to, previous shareholder proposals.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions:

- An unfettered<sup>3</sup> right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold;
- A majority vote standard in uncontested director elections;
- No non-shareholder-approved pill; and
- An annually elected board.

### **Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings**

Vote AGAINST management or shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders' ability to call special meetings.

Generally vote FOR management or shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account the following factors:

- Shareholders' current right to call special meetings;
- Minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10% preferred);
- The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;
- Investor ownership structure; and
- Shareholder support of, and management's response to, previous shareholder proposals.

<sup>3</sup> "Unfettered" means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting.

## CAPITAL/RESTRUCTURING

### Common Stock Authorization

Vote FOR proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with a transaction on the same ballot that warrants support.

Vote AGAINST proposals at companies with more than one class of common stock to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights.

Vote AGAINST proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares if a vote for a reverse stock split on the same ballot is warranted despite the fact that the authorized shares would not be reduced proportionally.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on all other proposals to increase the number of shares of common stock authorized for issuance. Take into account company-specific factors that include, at a minimum, the following:

- Past Board Performance:
  - The company's use of authorized shares during the last three years
- The Current Request:
  - Disclosure in the proxy statement of the specific purposes of the proposed increase;
  - Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request; and
  - The dilutive impact of the request as determined by an allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company's need for shares and total shareholder returns.

### Preferred Stock Authorization

Vote FOR proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with a transaction on the same ballot that warrants support.

Vote AGAINST proposals at companies with more than one class or series of preferred stock to increase the number of authorized shares of the class or series of preferred stock that has superior voting rights.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on all other proposals to increase the number of shares of preferred stock authorized for issuance. Take into account company-specific factors that include, at a minimum, the following:

- Past Board Performance:
  - The company's use of authorized preferred shares during the last three years;
- The Current Request:
  - Disclosure in the proxy statement of the specific purposes for the proposed increase;
  - Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request;
  - In cases where the company has existing authorized preferred stock, the dilutive impact of the request as determined by an allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company's need for shares and total shareholder returns; and
  - Whether the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes.

### Mergers and Acquisitions

Vote CASE –BY- CASE on mergers and acquisitions. Review and evaluate the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

- *Valuation* - Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction and strategic rationale.
- *Market reaction* - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal.
- *Strategic rationale* - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.
- *Negotiations and process* - Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm's-length? Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Significant negotiation "wins" can also signify the deal makers' competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process (e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect shareholder value.
- *Conflicts of interest* - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger. The CIC figure presented in the "ISS Transaction Summary" section of this report is an aggregate figure that can in certain cases be a misleading indicator of the true value transfer from shareholders to insiders. Where such figure appears to be excessive, analyze the underlying assumptions to determine whether a potential conflict exists.

- *Governance* - Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

## COMPENSATION

### Executive Pay Evaluation

Underlying all evaluations are five global principles that most investors expect corporations to adhere to in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs:

1. Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment, with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: This principle encompasses overall executive pay practices, which must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. It will take into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance; the mix between fixed and variable pay; performance goals; and equity-based plan costs;
2. Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation;
3. Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed);
4. Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly;
5. Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that compensation to outside directors does not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.

### Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation- Management Proposals (Management Say-on-Pay)

Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation CASE-BY-CASE.

Vote AGAINST management say on pay (MSOP) proposals, AGAINST/WITHHOLD on compensation committee members (or, in rare cases where the full board is deemed responsible, all directors including the CEO), and/or AGAINST an equity-based incentive plan proposal if:

- There is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);
- The company maintains problematic pay practices;
- The board exhibits poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

### Voting Alternatives

In general, the management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices-- dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against MSOP rather than withholding or voting against the compensation committee. However, if there is no MSOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior MSOP proposal, then vote withhold or against compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then vote AGAINST an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval.

### Additional CASE-BY-CASE considerations for the management say on pay (MSOP) proposals:

- Evaluation of performance metrics in short-term and long-term plans, as discussed and explained in the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A). Consider the measures, goals, and target awards reported by the company for executives’ short- and long-term incentive awards: disclosure, explanation of their alignment with the company’s business strategy, and whether goals appear to be sufficiently challenging in relation to resulting payouts;
- Evaluation of peer group benchmarking used to set target pay or award opportunities. Consider the rationale stated by the company for constituents in its pay benchmarking peer group, as well as the benchmark targets it uses to set or validate executives’ pay (e.g., median, 75th percentile, etc.) to ascertain whether the benchmarking process is sound or may result in pay “ratcheting” due to inappropriate peer group constituents (e.g., much larger companies) or targeting (e.g., above median); and
- Balance of performance-based versus non-performance-based pay. Consider the ratio of performance-based (not including plain vanilla stock options) vs. non-performance-based pay elements reported for the CEO’s latest reported fiscal year compensation, especially in conjunction with concerns about other factors such as performance metrics/goals, benchmarking practices, and pay-for-performance disconnects.

## Primary Evaluation Factors for Executive Pay

### **Pay for Performance**

Evaluate the alignment of the CEO's pay with performance over time, focusing particularly on companies that have underperformed their peers over a sustained period. From a shareholders' perspective, performance is predominantly gauged by the company's stock performance over time. Even when financial or operational measures are utilized in incentive awards, the achievement related to these measures should ultimately translate into superior shareholder returns in the long-term.

Focus on companies with sustained underperformance relative to peers, considering the following key factors:

- Whether a company's one-year and three-year total shareholder returns ("TSR") are in the bottom half of its industry group (i.e., four-digit GICS – Global Industry Classification Group); and
- Whether the total compensation of a CEO who has served at least two consecutive fiscal years is aligned with the company's total shareholder return over time, including both recent and long-term periods.

If a company falls in the bottom half of its four-digit GICS, further analysis of the CD&A is required to better understand the various pay elements and whether they create or reinforce shareholder alignment. Also assess the CEO's pay relative to the company's TSR over a time horizon of at least five years. The most recent year-over-year increase or decrease in pay remains a key consideration, but there will be additional emphasis on the long term trend of CEO total compensation relative to shareholder return. Also consider the mix of performance-based compensation relative to total compensation. In general, standard stock options or time-vested restricted stock are not considered to be performance-based. If a company provides performance-based incentives to its executives, the company is highly encouraged to provide the complete disclosure of the performance measure and goals (hurdle rate) so that shareholders can assess the rigor of the performance program. The use of non-GAAP financial metrics also makes it very challenging for shareholders to ascertain the rigor of the program as shareholders often cannot tell the type of adjustments being made and if the adjustments were made consistently. Complete and transparent disclosure helps shareholders to better understand the company's pay for performance linkage.

### **Problematic Pay Practices**

If the company maintains problematic pay practices, generally vote:

- AGAINST management "say on pay" (MSOP) proposals;
- AGAINST/WITHHOLD on compensation committee members (or in rare cases where the full board is deemed responsible, all directors including the CEO):
  - o In egregious situations;
  - o When no MSOP item is on the ballot; or
  - o When the board has failed to respond to concerns raised in prior MSOP evaluations; and/or
- AGAINST an equity incentive plan proposal if excessive non-performance-based equity awards are the major contributors to a pay-for-performance misalignment.

The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:

- Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;
- Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking; and
- Options Backdating.

### **Problematic Pay Practices related to Non-Performance-Based Compensation Elements**

Pay elements that are not directly based on performance are generally evaluated CASE-BY-CASE considering the context of a company's overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. Please refer to ISS' Compensation FAQ document for detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as potentially problematic and may lead to negative recommendations if they are deemed to be inappropriate or unjustified relative to executive pay best practices. The list below highlights the problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:

- Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARS without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options);
- Excessive perquisites or tax gross-ups, including any gross-up related to a secular trust or restricted stock vesting;
- New or extended agreements that provide for:
  - o CIC payments exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus;
  - o CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties ("single" or "modified single" triggers);
  - o CIC payments with excise tax gross-ups (including "modified" gross-ups).

### **Incentives that may Motivate Excessive Risk-Taking**

Assess company policies and disclosure related to compensation that could incentivize excessive risk-taking, for example:

- Multi-year guaranteed bonuses;
- A single performance metric used for short- and long-term plans;
- Lucrative severance packages;
- High pay opportunities relative to industry peers;
- Disproportionate supplemental pensions; or

- Mega annual equity grants that provide unlimited upside with no downside risk.

Factors that potentially mitigate the impact of risky incentives include rigorous claw-back provisions and robust stock ownership/holding guidelines.

### **Options Backdating**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on options backdating issues. Generally, when a company has recently practiced options backdating, WITHHOLD from or vote AGAINST the compensation committee, depending on the severity of the practices and the subsequent corrective actions on the part of the board. When deciding on votes on compensation committee members who oversaw questionable options grant practices or current compensation committee members who fail to respond to the issue proactively, consider several factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

- Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;
- Duration of options backdating;
- Size of restatement due to options backdating;
- Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and
- Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.

A CASE-BY-CASE analysis approach allows distinctions to be made between companies that had “sloppy” plan administration versus those that acted deliberately and/or committed fraud, as well as those companies that subsequently took corrective action. Cases where companies have committed fraud are considered most egregious.

### **Board Communications and Responsiveness**

Consider the following factors CASE-BY-CASE when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay:

- Poor disclosure practices, including:
  - Unclear explanation of how the CEO is involved in the pay setting process;
  - Retrospective performance targets and methodology not discussed;
  - Methodology for benchmarking practices and/or peer group not disclosed and explained.
- Board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues, for example:
  - Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or
  - Failure to respond to concerns raised in connection with significant opposition to MSOP proposals.

### **Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Management "Say on Pay")**

Vote FOR annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies' executive pay programs.

### **Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to approve the company's golden parachute compensation, consistent with ISS' policies on problematic pay practices related to severance packages. Features that may lead to a vote AGAINST include:

- Recently adopted or materially amended agreements that include excise tax gross-up provisions (since prior annual meeting);
- Recently adopted or materially amended agreements that include modified single triggers (since prior annual meeting);
- Single trigger payments that will happen immediately upon a change in control, including cash payment and such items as the acceleration of performance-based equity despite the failure to achieve performance measures;
- Single-trigger vesting of equity based on a definition of change in control that requires only shareholder approval of the transaction (rather than consummation);
- Potentially excessive severance payments;
- Recent amendments or other changes that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders;
- In the case of a substantial gross-up from pre-existing/grandfathered contract: the element that triggered the gross-up (i.e., option mega-grants at low point in stock price, unusual or outsized payments in cash or equity made or negotiated prior to the merger); or
- The company's assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote. ISS would view this as problematic from a corporate governance perspective.

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company's separate advisory vote on compensation ("management "say on pay"), ISS will evaluate the "say on pay" proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.

### **Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on equity-based compensation plans. Vote AGAINST the equity plan if any of the following factors apply:

- The total cost of the company's equity plans is unreasonable;
- The plan expressly permits the repricing of stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval;

- The CEO is a participant in the proposed equity-based compensation plan and there is a disconnect between CEO pay and the company's performance where over 50 percent of the year-over-year increase is attributed to equity awards (see Pay-for-Performance);
- The company's three year burn rate exceeds the greater of 2% or the mean plus one standard deviation of its industry group but no more than two percentage points (+/-) from the prior-year industry group cap;
- Liberal Change of Control Definition: The plan provides for the acceleration of vesting of equity awards even though an actual change in control may not occur (e.g., upon shareholder approval of a transaction or the announcement of a tender offer); or
- The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices.

### **Shareholder Proposals on Compensation**

#### **Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits**

Generally vote FOR proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.

#### **Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain all or a significant portion of the shares acquired through compensation plans, either:

- while employed and/or for two years following the termination of their employment ; or
- for a substantial period following the lapse of all other vesting requirements for the award ("lock-up period"), with ratable release of a portion of the shares annually during the lock-up period.

The following factors will be taken into account:

- Whether the company has any holding period, retention ratio, or officer ownership requirements in place. These should consist of:
  - Rigorous stock ownership guidelines;
  - A holding period requirement coupled with a significant long-term ownership requirement; or
  - A meaningful retention ratio;
- Actual officer stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent's suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company's own stock ownership or retention requirements;
- Post-termination holding requirement policies or any policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by senior executives;
- Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may promote a short-term versus a long-term focus.

A rigorous stock ownership guideline should be at least 10x base salary for the CEO, with the multiple declining for other executives. A meaningful retention ratio should constitute at least 50 percent of the stock received from equity awards (on a net proceeds basis) held on a long-term basis, such as the executive's tenure with the company or even a few years past the executive's termination with the company.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring Named Executive Officers to retain 75% of the shares acquired through compensation plans while employed and/or for two years following the termination of their employment, and to report to shareholders regarding this policy. The following factors will be taken into account:

- Whether the company has any holding period, retention ratio, or officer ownership requirements in place. These should consist of:
  - Rigorous stock ownership guidelines, or
  - A holding period requirement coupled with a significant long-term ownership requirement, or
  - A meaningful retention ratio,
- Actual officer stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent's suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company's own stock ownership or retention requirements.
- Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may promote a short-term versus a long-term focus.

A rigorous stock ownership guideline should be at least 10x base salary for the CEO, with the multiple declining for other executives. A meaningful retention ratio should constitute at least 50 percent of the stock received from equity awards (on a net proceeds basis) held on a long-term basis, such as the executive's tenure with the company or even a few years past the executive's termination with the company.

Generally vote AGAINST shareholder proposals that mandate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board. While ISS favors stock ownership on the part of directors, the company should determine the appropriate ownership requirement.

## Social/Environmental Issues

### Overall Approach

- When evaluating social and environmental shareholder proposals, ISS considers the following factors:
- Whether adoption of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder value;
- Whether the information requested concerns business issues that relate to a meaningful percentage of the company's business as measured by sales, assets, and earnings;
- The degree to which the company's stated position on the issues raised in the proposal could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to a boycott or selective purchasing;
- Whether the issues presented are more appropriately/effectively dealt with through governmental or company-specific action;
- Whether the company has already responded in some appropriate manner to the request embodied in the proposal;
- Whether the company's analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders are persuasive;
- What other companies have done in response to the issue addressed in the proposal;
- Whether the proposal itself is well framed and the cost of preparing the report is reasonable;
- Whether implementation of the proposal's request would achieve the proposal's objectives;
- Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board;
- Whether the requested information is available to shareholders either from the company or from a publicly available source; and
- Whether providing this information would reveal proprietary or confidential information that would place the company at a competitive disadvantage.

### Board Diversity

Generally vote *FOR* requests for reports on the company's efforts to diversify the board, unless:

- The gender and racial minority representation of the company's board is reasonably inclusive in relation to companies of similar size and business; and
- The board already reports on its nominating procedures and gender and racial minority initiatives on the board and within the company.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals asking the company to increase the gender and racial minority representation on its board, taking into account:

- The degree of existing gender and racial minority diversity on the company's board and among its executive officers;
- The level of gender and racial minority representation that exists at the company's industry peers;
- The company's established process for addressing gender and racial minority board representation;
- Whether the proposal includes an overly prescriptive request to amend nominating committee charter language;
- The independence of the company's nominating committee;
- The company uses an outside search firm to identify potential director nominees; and
- Whether the company has had recent controversies, fines, or litigation regarding equal employment practices.

### Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation, and Domestic Partner Benefits

Generally vote *FOR* proposals seeking to amend a company's EEO statement or diversity policies to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity, unless the change would result in excessive costs for the company.

Generally vote *AGAINST* proposals to extend company benefits to, or eliminate benefits from domestic partners. Decisions regarding benefits should be left to the discretion of the company.

### Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions

Generally vote *FOR* proposals requesting a report on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from company operations and/or products and operations, unless:

- The company already provides current, publicly-available information on the impacts that GHG emissions may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities;
- The company's level of disclosure is comparable to that of industry peers; and
- There are no significant, controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company's GHG emissions.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals that call for the adoption of GHG reduction goals from products and operations, taking into account:

- Overly prescriptive requests for the reduction in GHG emissions by specific amounts or within a specific time frame;
- Whether company disclosure lags behind industry peers;
- Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to GHG emissions;
- The feasibility of reduction of GHGs given the company's product line and current technology and;
- Whether the company already provides meaningful disclosure on GHG emissions from its products and operations.

### **Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Compensation-Related Proposals**

Generally vote AGAINST proposals to link, or report on linking, executive compensation to environmental and social criteria such as corporate downsizings, customer or employee satisfaction, community involvement, human rights, environmental performance, or predatory lending. However, the following factors will be considered:

- Whether the company has significant and persistent controversies or violations regarding social and/or environmental issues;
- Whether the company has management systems and oversight mechanisms in place regarding its social and environmental performance;
- The degree to which industry peers have incorporated similar non-financial performance criteria in their executive compensation practices; and
- The company's current level of disclosure regarding its environmental and social performance.

Generally vote AGAINST proposals calling for an analysis of the pay disparity between corporate executives and other non-executive employees. The value of the information sought by such proposals is unclear.

### **Political Contributions and Trade Associations Spending**

Generally vote AGAINST proposals asking the company to affirm political nonpartisanship in the workplace so long as:

- There are no recent, significant controversies, fines or litigation regarding the company's political contributions or trade association spending; and
- The company has procedures in place to ensure that employee contributions to company-sponsored political action committees (PACs) are strictly voluntary and prohibits coercion.

Vote AGAINST proposals to publish in newspapers and public media the company's political contributions. Such publications could present significant cost to the company without providing commensurate value to shareholders.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to improve the disclosure of a company's political contributions and trade association spending considering:

- Recent significant controversy or litigation related to the company's political contributions or governmental affairs; and
- The public availability of a company policy on political contributions and trade association spending including information on the types of organizations supported, the business rationale for supporting these organizations, and the oversight and compliance procedures related to such expenditures of corporate assets.

Vote AGAINST proposals barring the company from making political contributions. Businesses are affected by legislation at the federal, state, and local level and barring political contributions can put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Vote AGAINST proposals asking for a list of company executives, directors, consultants, legal counsels, lobbyists, or investment bankers that have prior government service and whether such service had a bearing on the business of the company. Such a list would be burdensome to prepare without providing any meaningful information to shareholders.

### **Labor and Human Rights Standards**

Generally vote FOR proposals requesting a report on company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies unless such information is already publicly disclosed.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to implement company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies, considering:

- The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed;
- Whether or not existing relevant policies are consistent with internationally recognized standards;
- Whether company facilities and those of its suppliers are monitored and how;
- Company participation in fair labor organizations or other internationally recognized human rights initiatives;
- Scope and nature of business conducted in markets known to have higher risk of workplace labor/human rights abuse;
- Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights at the company or its suppliers;
- The scope of the request; and
- Deviation from industry sector peer company standards and practices.

### **Sustainability Reporting**

Generally vote FOR proposals requesting the company to report on its policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms related to social, economic, and environmental sustainability, unless:

- The company already discloses similar information through existing reports or policies such as an Environment, Health, and Safety (EHS) report; a comprehensive Code of Corporate Conduct; and/or a Diversity Report; or
- The company has formally committed to the implementation of a reporting program based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines or a similar standard within a specified time frame.

March 2011

**Goldman Sachs Asset Management  
("GSAM")\***

**POLICY ON PROXY VOTING  
FOR INVESTMENT ADVISORY CLIENTS**

GSAM has adopted the policies and procedures set out below regarding the voting of proxies on securities held in client accounts (the "Policy"). These policies and procedures are designed to ensure that where GSAM has the authority to vote proxies, GSAM complies with its legal, fiduciary and contractual obligations.

**Guiding Principles**

Proxy voting and the analysis of corporate governance issues in general are important elements of the portfolio management services we provide to our advisory clients who have authorized us to address these matters on their behalf. Our guiding principles in performing proxy voting are to make decisions that (i) favor proposals that in GSAM's view tend to maximize a company's shareholder value and (ii) are not influenced by conflicts of interest. These principles reflect GSAM's belief that sound corporate governance will create a framework within which a company can be managed in the interests of its shareholders.

**Public Equity Investments**

To implement these guiding principles for investments in publicly-traded equities for which we have voting power on any record date, we follow customized proxy voting guidelines that have been developed by GSAM portfolio management (the "GSAM Guidelines"). The GSAM Guidelines embody the positions and factors GSAM generally considers important in casting proxy votes. They address a wide variety of individual topics, including, among other matters, shareholder voting rights, anti-takeover defenses, board structures, the election of directors, executive and director compensation, reorganizations, mergers, issues of corporate social responsibility and various shareholder proposals. Recognizing the complexity and fact-specific nature of many corporate governance issues, the GSAM Guidelines identify factors we consider in

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\* For purposes of this Policy, "GSAM" refers, collectively, to Goldman Sachs Asset Management, L.P.; Goldman Sachs Asset Management International; Goldman Sachs Hedge Fund Strategies LLC; GS Investment Strategies, LLC; Goldman Sachs (Singapore) Pte.; Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.; Goldman Sachs Asset Management Korea Co., Ltd.; Goldman Sachs Asset Management Co. Ltd.; Goldman Sachs & Partners Australia Pty Ltd.; Beijing Gao Hua Securities Company Limited; Goldman Sachs (China) L.L.C.; Goldman Sachs Asset Management (India) Private Limited; Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Private Limited; Goldman Sachs Representacoes Ltda.; Goldman Sachs Asset Management Brasil LTDA; GS Investment Strategies Canada Inc.; Goldman Sachs Management (Ireland) Ltd.

determining how the vote should be cast. A summary of the GSAM Guidelines is attached as Appendix A.

The principles and positions reflected in this Policy are designed to guide us in voting proxies, and not necessarily in making investment decisions. Portfolio management teams base their determinations of whether to invest in a particular company on a variety of factors, and while corporate governance may be one such factor, it may not be the primary consideration.

GSAM periodically reviews this Policy, including our use of the GSAM Guidelines, to ensure it continues to be consistent with our guiding principles.

### ***Implementation by Portfolio Management Teams***

#### General Overview

GSAM seeks to fulfill its proxy voting obligations through the implementation of this Policy and the oversight and maintenance of the GSAM Guidelines. In this connection, GSAM has retained a third-party proxy voting service (“Proxy Service”)\*\* to assist in the implementation of certain proxy voting-related functions. Among its responsibilities, the Proxy Service prepares a written analysis and recommendation (a “Recommendation”) of each proxy vote that reflects the Proxy Service’s application of the GSAM Guidelines to the particular proxy issues.

GSAM’s portfolio management teams (each, a “Portfolio Management Team”) generally cast proxy votes consistently with the GSAM Guidelines and the Recommendations. Each Portfolio Management Team, however, may on certain proxy votes seek approval to diverge from the GSAM Guidelines or a Recommendation by following an “override” process. The override process requires: (i) the requesting Portfolio Management Team to set forth the reasons for their decision; (ii) the approval of the Chief Investment Officer for the requesting Portfolio Management Team; (iii) notification to senior management of GSAM and/or other appropriate GSAM personnel; (iv) an attestation that the decision is not influenced by any conflict of interest; and (v) the creation of a written record reflecting the process.

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\*\*The third-party proxy voting service currently retained by GSAM is Institutional Shareholder Services, a unit of Risk Metrics Group.

A Portfolio Management Team that receives approval through the override process to cast a proxy vote that diverges from the GSAM Guidelines and/or a Recommendation may vote differently than other Portfolio Management Teams that did not seek an override for that particular vote.

#### Fundamental Equity and GS Investment Strategies Portfolio Management Teams

The Fundamental Equity and GS Investment Strategies Portfolio Management Teams view the analysis of corporate governance practices as an integral part of the investment research and stock valuation process. On a case-by-case basis, and subject to the approval process described above, each Fundamental Equity Portfolio Management Team and the GS Investment Strategies Portfolio Management Team may vote differently than the GSAM Guidelines or a particular Recommendation. In forming their views on particular matters, these Portfolio Management Teams may consider applicable regional rules and practices, including codes of conduct and other guides, regarding proxy voting, in addition to the GSAM Guidelines and Recommendations.

#### Quantitative Investment Strategies Portfolio Management Teams

The Quantitative Investment Strategies Portfolio Management Teams have decided to follow the GSAM Guidelines and Recommendations exclusively, based on such Portfolio Management Teams' investment philosophy and approach to portfolio construction, as well as their participation in the creation of the GSAM Guidelines and their evaluation of the Proxy Service's process of preparing Recommendations. The Quantitative Investment Strategies Portfolio Management Teams may from time to time, however, review and individually assess any specific shareholder vote.

#### ***Potential Limitations on GSAM's Ability to Vote Proxies***

In certain circumstances, such as if a security is on loan through a securities lending program or held by a prime broker, the Portfolio Management Teams may not be able to participate in certain proxy votes unless the shares of the particular issuer are recalled in time to cast a vote. A determination of whether to seek a recall will be based on whether the applicable Portfolio Management Team determines that the benefit of voting outweighs the costs, lost revenue, and/or other detriments of retrieving the securities, recognizing that the handling of such recall requests is beyond GSAM's control and may not be satisfied in time for GSAM to vote the shares in question.

From time to time, GSAM may face regulatory or compliance limits on the types or amounts of voting securities that it may purchase or hold for client accounts. Among other limits, federal, state, foreign regulatory restrictions, or company-specific ownership limits may restrict the total percentage of an issuer's voting securities that GSAM can hold for clients. As a result, in certain circumstances in order to comply with such limits and/or internal policies designed to comply with such limits, proxy voting in certain issuers may be restricted or delegated to the Proxy Service or to another qualified, independent third party.

GSAM clients who have delegated voting responsibility to GSAM with respect to their account may from time to time contact their client representative if they would like to direct GSAM to vote in a particular solicitation. GSAM will use its commercially reasonable efforts to vote according to the client's request in these circumstances, and cannot provide assurances that such voting requests will be implemented.

### ***Use of a Proxy Service***

As discussed above, GSAM utilizes a Proxy Service to assist in the implementation and administration of GSAM's proxy voting function. The Proxy Service assists GSAM in the proxy voting process by providing operational, recordkeeping and reporting services. In addition, the Proxy Service produces Recommendations as previously discussed and provides assistance in the development and maintenance of the GSAM Guidelines. GSAM conducts periodic due diligence meetings with the Proxy Service which include, but are not limited to, a review of the Proxy Service's general organizational structure, new developments with respect to research and technology, work flow improvements and internal due diligence with respect to conflicts of interest.

GSAM may hire other service providers to replace or supplement the Proxy Service with respect to any of the services GSAM currently receives from the Proxy Service. In addition, individual Portfolio Management Teams may supplement the information and analyses the Proxy Service provides from other sources.

### ***Conflicts of Interest***

Pursuant to this Policy, GSAM has implemented processes designed to prevent conflicts of interest from influencing its proxy voting decisions. These processes include the use of the GSAM Guidelines and Recommendations and the override process described above in instances when a Portfolio Management Team is interested in voting in a manner that diverges from the GSAM Guidelines and/or a Recommendation.

### **Fixed Income and Private Investments**

Voting decisions with respect to client investments in fixed income securities and the securities of privately-held issuers generally will be made by the relevant Portfolio Management Teams based on their assessment of the particular transactions or other matters at issue. Such Portfolio Management Teams may also adopt policies related to the fixed income or private investments they make that supplement this Policy.

### **Alternative Investment and Manager Selection ("AIMS") and Externally Managed Strategies**

Where GSAM places client assets with managers outside of GSAM, which function occurs primarily within GSAM's AIMS business unit, such external managers generally will be responsible for voting proxies in accordance with the managers' own policies.

AIMS may, however, retain proxy voting responsibilities where it deems appropriate or necessary under prevailing circumstances. To the extent AIMS portfolio managers assume proxy voting responsibility with respect to publicly-traded equity securities they will follow the GSAM Guidelines and Recommendations as discussed above unless an override is requested. Any other voting decision will be conducted in accordance with AIMS' policies governing voting decisions with respect to non-publicly traded equity securities held by their clients.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **GSAM Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary**

The following is a summary of the material GSAM Proxy Voting Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), which form the substantive basis of GSAM’s Policy on Proxy Voting for Client Accounts (“Policy”). As described in the main body of the Policy, one or more GSAM portfolio management teams may diverge from the Guidelines and a related Recommendation on any particular proxy vote or in connection with any individual investment decision in accordance with the override process described in the Policy.

#### **US proxy items**

<b>1. Operational Items</b>	<b>page 1</b>
<b>2. Board of Directors</b>	<b>page 2</b>
<b>3. Executive and Director Compensation</b>	<b>page 4</b>
<b>4. Proxy Contests</b>	<b>page 8</b>
<b>5. Shareholder Rights and Defenses</b>	<b>page 8</b>
<b>6. Mergers and Corporate Restructurings</b>	<b>page 9</b>
<b>7. State of Incorporation</b>	<b>page 10</b>
<b>8. Capital Structure</b>	<b>page 10</b>
<b>9. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Issues</b>	<b>page 10</b>

#### **International proxy items**

<b>1. Operational Items</b>	<b>page 12</b>
<b>2. Board of Directors</b>	<b>page 13</b>
<b>3. Compensation</b>	<b>page 15</b>
<b>4. Board Structure</b>	<b>page 15</b>
<b>5. Capital Structure</b>	<b>page 16</b>
<b>6. Other</b>	<b>page 18</b>
<b>7. Environmental, Climate Change and Social Issues</b>	<b>page 18</b>

*The following section is a summary of the Guidelines, which form the substantive basis of the Policy with respect to U.S. public equity investments.*

#### **1. Operational Items**

##### **Auditor Ratification**

Vote FOR proposals to ratify auditors, unless any of the following apply within the last year:

- An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;
- There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position;
- Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; or material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures; or
- Fees for non-audit services are excessive.

Non-audit fees are excessive if:

- Non-audit fees exceed audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation fees.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on shareholder proposals asking companies to prohibit or limit their auditors from engaging in non-audit services taking into account issues that are consistent with SEC rules adopted to fulfill the mandate of Sarbanes Oxley such as an audit firm providing services that would impair its independence or the overall scope and disclosure of fees for all services done by the audit firm.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on shareholder proposals asking for audit firm rotation, taking into account:

- The tenure of the audit firm;
- The length of rotation specified in the proposal;
- Any significant audit-related issues at the company;
- The number of Audit Committee meetings held each year;
- The number of financial experts serving on the committee;
- Whether the company has a periodic renewal process where the auditor is evaluated for both audit quality and competitive price; and
- Whether the auditors are being changed without explanation.

## **2. Board of Directors**

### Classification of Directors

Where applicable, the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ Listing Standards definition is to be used to classify directors as insiders or affiliated outsiders. General definitions are as follows:

- Inside Director
  - Employee of the company or one of its affiliates
  - Among the five most highly paid individuals (excluding interim CEO)
  - Listed as an officer as defined under Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
  - Current interim CEO
  - Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company's voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group)
- Affiliated Outside Director
  - Board attestation that an outside director is not independent
  - Former CEO or other executive of the company within the last 3 years
  - Former CEO or other executive of an acquired company within the past three years
- Independent Outside Director
  - No material connection to the company other than a board seat

Additionally, GSAM will consider compensation committee interlocking directors to be affiliated (defined as CEOs who sit on each other's compensation committees).

### **Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections**

Vote on director nominees should be determined on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from individual directors who:

- Attend less than 75 percent of the board and committee meetings without a disclosed valid excuse for each of the last two years;
- Sit on more than six public company boards;
- Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own--withhold only at their outside boards.

Other items considered for an AGAINST vote include specific concerns about the individual or the company, such as criminal

wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary responsibilities, sanctions from government or authority, violations of laws and regulations, or other issues related to improper business practice.

In limited circumstances, we may vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from all nominees of the board of directors (except from new nominees who should be considered on a CASE-BY-CASE basis and except as discussed below) if:

- The company's poison pill has a dead-hand or modified dead-hand feature for two or more years. Vote against/withhold every year until this feature is removed; however, vote against the poison pill if there is one on the ballot with this feature rather than the director;
- The board adopts or renews a poison pill without shareholder approval, does not commit to putting it to shareholder vote within 12 months of adoption (or in the case of a newly public company, does not commit to put the pill to a shareholder vote within 12 months following the IPO), or reneges on a commitment to put the pill to a vote, and has not yet received a withhold/against recommendation for this issue;
- The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of the shareholders tendered their shares;
- If in an extreme situation the board lacks accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers.

Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from Inside Directors and Affiliated Outside Directors (per the Classification of Directors above) when:

- The inside or affiliated outside director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating (vote against affiliated directors only for nominating) committees;
- The company lacks an audit compensation, or nominating (vote against affiliated directors only for nominating) committee so that the full board functions as that committee and insiders are participating in voting on matters that independent committees should be voting on;
- The full board is less than majority independent (in this case withhold from affiliated outside directors); At controlled companies, GSAM will vote against the election of affiliated outsiders and nominees affiliated with the parent and will not vote against the executives of the issuer.

Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from members of the appropriate committee for the following reasons (or independent Chairman or lead director in cases of a classified board and members of appropriate committee are not up for reelection). Extreme cases may warrant a vote against the entire board.

- At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the underlying issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote (members of the Nominating or Governance Committees);
- The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received approval of the majority of shares cast for the previous two consecutive years (a management proposal with other than a FOR recommendation by management will not be considered as sufficient action taken); an adopted proposal that is substantially similar to the original shareholder proposal will be deemed sufficient; (members of the committee of the board that is responsible for the issue under consideration).

Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from the members of the Audit Committee if:

- The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive;
- The company receives an adverse opinion on the company's financial statements from its auditor; or
- There is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on members of the Audit Committee and/or the full board if poor accounting practices, which rise to a level of serious concern are identified, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures.

Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence and duration, as well as the company's efforts at remediation or corrective actions in determining whether negative vote recommendations are warranted against the members of the Audit Committee who are responsible for the poor accounting practices, or the entire board.

See section 3 on executive and director compensation for reasons to withhold from members of the Compensation Committee.

### **Shareholder proposal regarding Independent Chair (Separate Chair/CEO)**

Vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

GSAM will generally recommend a vote AGAINST shareholder proposals requiring that the chairman's position be filled by an independent director, if the company satisfies 3 of the 4 following criteria:

- Designated lead director, elected by and from the independent board members with clearly delineated and comprehensive duties;
- Two-thirds independent board;
- All independent key committees; or
- Established, disclosed governance guidelines.

### **Majority Vote Shareholder Proposals**

GSAM will vote FOR proposals requesting that the board adopt majority voting in the election of directors provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated.

GSAM also looks for companies to adopt a post-election policy outlining how the company will address the situation of a holdover director.

### **Cumulative Vote Shareholder Proposals**

GSAM will generally support shareholder proposals to restore or provide cumulative voting unless:

- The company has adopted majority vote standard with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.

## **3. Executive and Director Compensation**

### **Pay Practices**

Good pay practices should align management's interests with long-term shareholder value creation. Detailed disclosure of compensation criteria is required; proof that companies follow the criteria should be evident. Compensation practices should allow a company to attract and retain proven talent. Some examples of poor pay practices include: abnormally large bonus payouts without justifiable performance linkage or proper disclosure, egregious employment contracts, excessive severance and/or change in control provisions, repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/stock appreciation rights without prior shareholder approval, and excessive perquisites.

If the company maintains problematic or poor pay practices, generally vote first:

- AGAINST Management Say on Pay (MSOP) Proposals or;
- AGAINST an equity-based incentive plan proposal if excessive non-performance-based equity awards are the major contributor to a pay-for-performance misalignment, then;
- If no MSOP or equity-based incentive plan proposal item is on the ballot, AGAINST/WITHHOLD on compensation committee members (or, in rare cases where the full board is deemed responsible, all directors including the CEO) in egregious situations.

## Equity Compensation Plans

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on equity-based compensation plans. Reasons to vote AGAINST the equity plan could include any of the following factors:

- The plan is a vehicle for poor pay practices;
- The plan expressly permits the repricing of stock options/stock appreciation rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval OR does not expressly prohibit the repricing without shareholder approval;
- The CEO is a participant in the proposed equity-based compensation plan and there is a disconnect between CEO pay and the company's performance where over 50 percent of the year-over-year increase is attributed to equity awards;
- The company's three year burn rate and Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) calculations both materially exceed industry group metrics; or
- There is a long-term disconnect between CEO pay and the company's total shareholder return in conjunction with the qualitative overlay as outlined in the policy guidelines OR the company has a poor record of compensation practices, which is highlighted either in analysis of the compensation plan or the evaluation of the election of directors.

## Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay, MSOP) Management Proposals

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals for an advisory vote on executive compensation. For U.S. companies, consider the following factors in the context of each company's specific circumstances and the board's disclosed rationale for its practices. In general two or more of the following in conjunction with a long-term pay-for-performance disconnect will warrant an AGAINST vote. If there is not a long-term pay for performance disconnect GSAM will look for multiple problematic factors to be present to warrant a vote against.

### Relative Considerations:

- Assessment of performance metrics relative to business strategy, as discussed and explained in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) section of a company's proxy;
- Evaluation of peer groups used to set target pay or award opportunities;
- Alignment of long-term company performance and executive pay trends over time;
- Assessment of disparity between total pay of the CEO and other Named Executive Officers (NEOs).

### Design Considerations:

- Balance of fixed versus performance-driven pay;
- Assessment of excessive practices with respect to perks, severance packages, supplemental executive pension plans, and burn rates.

### Communication Considerations:

- Evaluation of information and board rationale provided in CD&A about how compensation is determined (e.g., why certain elements and pay targets are used, and specific incentive plan goals, especially retrospective goals); Assessment of board's responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues (e.g., in responding to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics).

### Other considerations include:

- Abnormally large bonus payouts without justifiable performance linkage or proper disclosure:
  - Includes performance metrics that are changed, canceled, or replaced during the performance period without adequate explanation of the action and the link to performance
- Egregious employment contracts:
  - Contracts containing multi-year guarantees for salary increases, non-performance based bonuses, and equity compensation.
- Excessive severance and/or change in control provisions:
  - Change in control cash payments exceeding 3 times base salary plus target/average/last paid bonus;
  - New or materially amended arrangements that provide for change-in-control payments without loss of job or substantial diminution of job duties (single-triggered),

- Excessive payments upon an executive's termination in connection with performance failure;
- Liberal change in control definition in individual contracts or equity plans which could result in payments to executives without an actual change in control occurring
- Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/stock appreciation rights without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts, option exchanges, and certain voluntary surrender of underwater options where shares surrendered may subsequently be re-granted).
- Excessive Perquisites:
  - Perquisites for former and/or retired executives, such as lifetime benefits, car allowances, personal use of corporate aircraft, or other inappropriate arrangements
  - Extraordinary relocation benefits (including home buyouts)
  - Excessive amounts of perquisites compensation

The following reasons could warrant a vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from the members of the Compensation Committee:

- Company has failed to address issues that led to an against vote in an MSOP;
- The company fails to submit one-time transfers of stock options to a shareholder vote;
- The company fails to fulfill the terms of a burn rate commitment they made to shareholders; or
- The company has backdated options.

### **Golden Parachutes**

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company's separate advisory vote on compensation MSOP), GSAM will incorporate the evaluation and could vote against the MSOP if we find problematic aspects to the Golden Parachutes. In general, the presence of two or more of the following factors could warrant a vote against:

- Recently adopted or materially amended agreements that include excise tax gross-up provisions (since prior annual meeting);
- Recently adopted or materially amended agreements that include modified single triggers (since prior annual meeting);
- Single trigger payments that will happen immediately upon a change in control, including cash payment and such items as the acceleration of performance-based equity despite the failure to achieve performance measures;
- Single-trigger vesting of equity based on a definition of change in control that requires only shareholder approval of the transaction (rather than consummation);
- Potentially excessive severance payments;
- Recent amendments or other changes that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders;
- In the case of a substantial gross-up from pre-existing/grandfathered contract: the element that triggered the gross-up (i.e., option mega-grants at low point in stock price, unusual or outsized payments in cash or equity made or negotiated prior to the merger); or
- The company's assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.

### **Other Compensation Proposals and Policies**

#### **Employee Stock Purchase Plans -- Non-Qualified Plans**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote FOR nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features:

- Broad-based participation (i.e., all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company);
- Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary;

- Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; and
- No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase since there is a company matching contribution.

Vote AGAINST nonqualified employee stock purchase plans when any of the plan features do not meet the above criteria. If the company matching contribution exceeds 25 percent of employee’s contribution, evaluate the cost of the plan against its allowable cap.

### **Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options, taking into consideration:

- Historic trading patterns--the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term;
- Rationale for the re-pricing--was the stock price decline beyond management’s control?
- Is this a value-for-value exchange?
- Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?
- Option vesting--does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?
- Term of the option--the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;
- Exercise price--should be set at fair market or a premium to market;
- Participants--executive officers and directors should be excluded.

Vote FOR shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.

### **Other Shareholder Proposals on Compensation**

#### **Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Frequency on Pay)**

Vote for annual frequency if no management recommendation; otherwise, support two or three year frequency if a company has an independent compensation committee and no long-term pay for performance disconnect identified.

#### **Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits**

Generally vote FOR proposals calling on companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals for which the broad-based employee population is eligible.

#### **Stock retention holding period**

Vote FOR Shareholder proposals asking for a policy requiring that senior executives retain a significant percentage of shares acquired through equity compensation programs if the policy allows retention for two years or less following the termination of their employment (through retirement or otherwise) **and** a holding threshold percentage of 50% or less.

Other factors to consider include:

- Whether the company has any holding period, retention ratio, or officer ownership requirements in place.

#### **Elimination of accelerated vesting in the event of a change in control**

Vote AGAINST shareholder proposals seeking a policy eliminating the accelerated vesting of time-based equity awards in the event of a change in control.

## **Tax Gross-Up Proposals**

Generally vote FOR proposals asking companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.

## **4. Proxy Contests**

### **Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors:

- Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry;
- Management's track record;
- Background to the proxy contest;
- Qualifications of director nominees (both slates);
- Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management;
- Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates);
- Stock ownership positions.

### **Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses. When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote FOR the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.

Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply:

- The election of fewer than 50% of the directors to be elected is contested in the election;
- One or more of the dissident's candidates is elected;
- Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; and
- The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw.

## **5. Shareholders Rights & Defenses**

### **Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent**

Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to act by written consent, unless:

- The company already gives shareholders the right to call special meetings at a threshold of 25% or lower; and
- The company has a history of strong governance practices.

### **Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings**

Generally vote FOR management proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings.

Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings at a threshold of 25% or lower if the company currently does not give shareholders the right to call special meetings. However, if a company already gives shareholders the right to call special meetings at a threshold of at least 25%, do not support shareholder proposals to further reduce the threshold.

## **Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on advance notice proposals, giving support to proposals that allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations reasonably close to the meeting date and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory and shareholder review.

## **Poison Pills**

Vote FOR shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it UNLESS the company has: (1) A shareholder-approved poison pill in place; or (2) the company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either:

- Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or
- The board, in exercising its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this “fiduciary out” will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate.

Vote FOR shareholder proposals calling for poison pills to be put to a vote within a time period of less than one year after adoption.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:

- No lower than a 20% trigger, flip-in or flip-over;
- A term of no more than three years;
- No dead-hand, slow-hand, no-hand or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;
- Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 25 percent or less of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill.

In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.

For management proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of preserving a company’s net operating losses (“NOL pills”), the following factors should be considered:

- the trigger (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5%);
- the value of the NOLs;
- the term;
- shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, causing expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs); and
- other factors that may be applicable.

## **6. Mergers and Corporate Restructurings**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following based on publicly available information:

- Valuation;
- Market reaction;
- Strategic rationale;
- Management’s track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions;
- Presence of conflicts of interest; and
- Governance profile of the combined company.

## **7. State of Incorporation**

### **Reincorporation Proposals**

Evaluate management or shareholder proposals to change a company's state of incorporation on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:

- Reasons for reincorporation;
- Comparison of company's governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and
- Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.

Vote FOR reincorporation when the economic factors outweigh any neutral or negative governance changes.

## **8. Capital Structure**

### **Common Stock Authorization**

Votes on proposals to increase the number of shares of common stock authorized for issuance are determined on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. We consider company-specific factors that include, at a minimum, the following:

- Past Board performance;
- The company's use of authorized shares during the last three years;
- One- and three-year total shareholder return;
- The board's governance structure and practices;
- The current request;
- Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific reasons for the proposed increase;
- The dilutive impact of the request as determined through an allowable increase, which examines the company's need for shares and total shareholder returns; and
- Risks to shareholders of not approving the request.

## **9. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Issues**

### **Overall Approach**

When evaluating social and environmental shareholder proposals, the following factors should be considered:

- Whether adoption of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder value;
- Whether the information requested concerns business issues that relate to a meaningful percentage of the company's business as measured by sales, assets, and earnings;
- The degree to which the company's stated position on the issues raised in the proposal could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to a boycott or selective purchasing;
- Whether the issues presented are more appropriately/effectively dealt with through governmental or company-specific action;
- Whether the company has already responded in some appropriate manner to the request embodied in the proposal;
- Whether the company's analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders are persuasive;
- What other companies have done in response to the issue addressed in the proposal;
- Whether the proposal itself is well framed and the cost of preparing the report is reasonable;
- Whether implementation of the proposal's request would achieve the proposal's objectives;
- Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board;
- Whether the requested information is available to shareholders either from the company or from a publicly available source; and
- Whether providing this information would reveal proprietary or confidential information that would place the company at a competitive disadvantage.

## **Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation**

A company should have a clear, public Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) statement outlining various factors that are not discriminated against. Generally vote FOR proposals seeking to amend a company's EEO statement or diversity policies to additionally prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity.

## **Lobbying Expenditures/Initiatives**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals requesting information on a company's lobbying initiatives, considering:

- Significant controversies, fines, or litigation surrounding a company's public policy activities;
- The company's current level of disclosure on lobbying strategy; and
- The impact that the policy issue may have on the company's business operations.

## **Political Contributions and Trade Association Spending**

Generally vote AGAINST proposals asking the company to affirm political nonpartisanship in the workplace so long as:

- There are no recent, significant controversies, fines or litigation regarding the company's political contributions or trade association spending; and
- The company has procedures in place to ensure that employee contributions to company-sponsored political action committees (PACs) are strictly voluntary and prohibits coercion.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to improve the disclosure of a company's political contributions and trade association spending, considering:

- Recent significant controversy or litigation related to the company's political contributions or governmental affairs;
- The public availability of a company policy on political contributions and trade association spending including information on the types of organizations supported, the business rationale for supporting these organizations, and the oversight and compliance procedures related to such expenditures of corporate assets; and

GSAM will not necessarily vote for the proposal merely to encourage further disclosure of trade association spending.

Vote AGAINST proposals barring the company from making political contributions. Businesses are affected by legislation at the federal, state, and local level and barring political contributions can put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

## **Labor and Human Rights Standards**

Generally vote FOR proposals requesting a report on company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies unless such information is already publicly disclosed.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to implement company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies, considering:

- The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed;
- Whether or not existing relevant policies are consistent with internationally recognized standards;
- Whether company facilities and those of its suppliers are monitored and how;
- Company participation in fair labor organizations or other internationally recognized human rights initiatives;
- Scope and nature of business conducted in markets known to have higher risk of workplace labor/human rights abuse;
- Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights at the company or its suppliers;
- The scope of the request; and
- Deviation from industry sector peer company standards and practices.

## **Sustainability and climate change reporting**

Generally vote FOR proposals requesting the company to report on its policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms related to social, economic, and environmental sustainability, or how the company may be impacted by climate change. The following factors will be considered:

- The company's current level of publicly-available disclosure including if the company already discloses similar information through existing reports or policies such as an Environment, Health, and Safety (EHS) report; a comprehensive Code of Corporate Conduct; and/or a Diversity Report or other similar report;
- If the company has formally committed to the implementation of a reporting program based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines or a similar standard within a specified time frame;
- If the company's current level of disclosure is comparable to that of its industry peers; and
- If there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company's environmental performance.

*The following section is a broad summary of the Guidelines, which form the basis of the Policy with respect to non-U.S. public equity investments. Applying these guidelines is subject to certain regional and country-specific exceptions and modifications and is not inclusive of all considerations in each market.*

### **1. Operational Items**

#### **Financial Results/Director and Auditor Reports**

Vote FOR approval of financial statements and director and auditor reports, unless:

- There are concerns about the accounts presented or audit procedures used; or
- The company is not responsive to shareholder questions about specific items that should be publicly disclosed.

#### **Appointment of Auditors and Auditor Fees**

Vote FOR the reelection of auditors and proposals authorizing the board to fix auditor fees, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the accounts presented, audit procedures used or audit opinion rendered;
- The auditors are being changed without explanation; non-audit-related fees are substantial or are in excess of standard annual audit-related fees; or the appointment of external auditors if they have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company.

#### **Appointment of Statutory Auditors**

Vote FOR the appointment or reelection of statutory auditors, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or the audit procedures used;
- Questions exist concerning any of the statutory auditors being appointed; or
- The auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company.

#### **Allocation of Income**

Vote FOR approval of the allocation of income, unless:

- The dividend payout ratio has been consistently low without adequate explanation; or
- The payout is excessive given the company's financial position.

#### **Stock (Scrip) Dividend Alternative**

Vote FOR most stock (scrip) dividend proposals.

Vote AGAINST proposals that do not allow for a cash option unless management demonstrates that the cash option is harmful to shareholder value.

### **Amendments to Articles of Association**

Vote amendments to the articles of association on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### **Change in Company Fiscal Term**

Vote FOR resolutions to change a company's fiscal term unless a company's motivation for the change is to postpone its AGM.

### **Lower Disclosure Threshold for Stock Ownership**

Vote AGAINST resolutions to lower the stock ownership disclosure threshold below 5 percent unless specific reasons exist to implement a lower threshold.

### **Amend Quorum Requirements**

Vote proposals to amend quorum requirements for shareholder meetings on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### **Transact Other Business**

Vote AGAINST other business when it appears as a voting item.

## **2. Board of Directors**

### **Director Elections**

Vote FOR management nominees in the election of directors, unless:

- Adequate disclosure has not been provided in a timely manner; or
- There are clear concerns over questionable finances or restatements; or
- There have been questionable transactions or conflicts of interest; or
- There are any records of abuses against minority shareholder interests; or
- The board fails to meet minimum corporate governance standards. or
- There are reservations about:
  - Director terms
  - Bundling of proposals to elect directors
  - Board independence
  - Disclosure of named nominees
  - Combined Chairman/CEO
  - Election of former CEO as Chairman of the Board
  - Overboarded directors
  - Composition of committees
  - Director independence
- Specific concerns about the individual or company, such as criminal wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary responsibilities; or
- Unless there are other considerations which may include sanctions from government or authority, violations of laws and regulations, or other issues related to improper business practice, failure to replace management, or egregious actions related to service on other boards.

Vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis in contested elections of directors, e.g., the election of shareholder nominees or the dismissal of incumbent directors, determining which directors are best suited to add value for shareholders.

Vote FOR employee and/or labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee and are required by law to be on those committees.

Vote AGAINST employee and/or labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee, if they are not required to be on those committees.

## **Classification of directors**

### **Executive Director**

- Employee or executive of the company;
- Any director who is classified as a non-executive, but receives salary, fees, bonus, and/or other benefits that are in line with the highest-paid executives of the company.

### **Non-Independent Non-Executive Director (NED)**

- Any director who is attested by the board to be a non-independent NED;
- Any director specifically designated as a representative of a significant shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is also an employee or executive of a significant shareholder of the company;
- Beneficial owner (direct or indirect) of at least 10% of the company's stock, either in economic terms or in voting rights (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group, e.g., family members who beneficially own less than 10% individually, but collectively own more than 10%), unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold (and in other special market-specific circumstances);
- Government representative;
- Currently provides (or a relative provides) professional services to the company, to an affiliate of the company, or to an individual officer of the company or of one of its affiliates in excess of \$10,000 per year;
- Represents customer, supplier, creditor, banker, or other entity with which company maintains transactional/commercial relationship (unless company discloses information to apply a materiality test);
- Any director who has conflicting or cross-directorships with executive directors or the chairman of the company;
- Relative of a current employee of the company or its affiliates;
- Relative of a former executive of the company or its affiliates;
- A new appointee elected other than by a formal process through the General Meeting (such as a contractual appointment by a substantial shareholder);
- Founder/co-founder/member of founding family but not currently an employee;
- Former executive (5 year cooling off period);
- Years of service is generally not a determining factor unless it is recommended best practice in a market and/or in extreme circumstances, in which case it may be considered;
- Any additional relationship or principle considered to compromise independence under local corporate governance best practice guidance.

### **Independent NED**

- No material connection, either directly or indirectly, to the company other than a board seat.

### **Employee Representative**

- Represents employees or employee shareholders of the company (classified as "employee representative" but considered a non-independent NED).

## **Discharge of Directors**

Generally vote FOR the discharge of directors, including members of the management board and/or supervisory board, unless there is reliable information about significant and compelling controversies that the board is not fulfilling its fiduciary duties warranted by:

- A lack of oversight or actions by board members which invoke shareholder distrust related to malfeasance or poor supervision, such as operating in private or company interest rather than in shareholder interest; or
- Any legal issues (e.g., civil/criminal) aiming to hold the board responsible for breach of trust in the past or related to currently alleged actions yet to be confirmed (and not only the fiscal year in question), such as price fixing, insider trading, bribery, fraud, and other illegal actions; or
- Other egregious governance issues where shareholders may bring legal action against the company or its directors; or
- Vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis where a vote against other agenda items are deemed inappropriate.

## **3. Compensation**

Good pay practices should align management's interests with long-term shareholder value creation. Detailed disclosure of compensation criteria is required; proof that companies follow the criteria should be evident. Compensation practices should allow a company to attract and retain proven talent. Some examples of poor pay practices include: abnormally large bonus payouts without justifiable performance linkage or proper disclosure, egregious employment contracts, excessive severance and/or change in control provisions, repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/stock appreciation rights without prior shareholder approval, and excessive perquisites.

### **Director Compensation**

Vote FOR proposals to award cash fees to non-executive directors unless the amounts are excessive relative to other companies in the country or industry.

Vote non-executive director compensation proposals that include both cash and share-based components on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

Vote proposals that bundle compensation for both non-executive and executive directors into a single resolution on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

Vote AGAINST proposals to introduce retirement benefits for non-executive directors.

### **Compensation Plans**

Vote compensation plans on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### **Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions**

Vote proposals seeking indemnification and liability protection for directors and officers on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

Vote AGAINST proposals to indemnify auditors.

## **4. Board Structure**

Vote FOR proposals to fix board size.

Vote AGAINST proposals to alter board structure or size in the context of a fight for control of the company or the board.

**Chairman CEO combined role** (for applicable markets)

GSAM will generally recommend a vote AGAINST shareholder proposals requiring that the chairman's position be filled by an independent director, if the company satisfies 3 of the 4 following criteria:

- 2/3 independent board, or majority in countries where employee representation is common practice;
- A designated, or a rotating, lead director, elected by and from the independent board members with clearly delineated and comprehensive duties;
- Fully independent key committees; and/or
- Established, publicly disclosed, governance guidelines and director biographies/profiles.

## **5. Capital Structure**

### **Share Issuance Requests**

*General Issuances:*

Vote FOR issuance requests with preemptive rights to a maximum of 100 percent over currently issued capital.

Vote FOR issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital.

### **Increases in Authorized Capital**

Vote FOR non-specific proposals to increase authorized capital up to 100 percent over the current authorization unless the increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding.

Vote FOR specific proposals to increase authorized capital to any amount, unless:

- The specific purpose of the increase (such as a share-based acquisition or merger) does not meet guidelines for the purpose being proposed; or
- The increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding after adjusting for all proposed issuances.

Vote AGAINST proposals to adopt unlimited capital authorizations.

### **Reduction of Capital**

Vote FOR proposals to reduce capital for routine accounting purposes unless the terms are unfavorable to shareholders.

Vote proposals to reduce capital in connection with corporate restructuring on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### **Capital Structures**

Vote FOR resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share, one-vote capital structure.

Vote AGAINST requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures or the creation of new or additional supervoting shares.

### **Preferred Stock**

Vote FOR the creation of a new class of preferred stock or for issuances of preferred stock up to 50 percent of issued capital unless the terms of the preferred stock would adversely affect the rights of existing shareholders.

Vote FOR the creation/issuance of convertible preferred stock as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote AGAINST the creation of a new class of preference shares that would carry superior voting rights to the common shares.

Vote AGAINST the creation of blank check preferred stock unless the board clearly states that the authorization will not be used to thwart a takeover bid.

Vote proposals to increase blank check preferred authorizations on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### **Debt Issuance Requests**

Vote non-convertible debt issuance requests on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, with or without preemptive rights.

Vote FOR the creation/issuance of convertible debt instruments as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote FOR proposals to restructure existing debt arrangements unless the terms of the restructuring would adversely affect the rights of shareholders.

### **Pledging of Assets for Debt**

Vote proposals to approve the pledging of assets for debt on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### **Increase in Borrowing Powers**

Vote proposals to approve increases in a company's borrowing powers on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### **Share Repurchase Plans**

GSAM will generally recommend FOR share repurchase programs if the terms comply with the following criteria:

- A repurchase limit of up to 10 percent of outstanding issued share capital;
- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- Duration of no more than 5 years, or such lower threshold as may be set by applicable law, regulation, or code of governance best practice.

In markets where it is normal practice not to provide a repurchase limit, the proposal will be evaluated based on the company's historical practice. In such cases, the authority must comply with the following criteria:

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- Duration of no more than 5 years.

In addition, vote AGAINST any proposal where:

- There is clear evidence of abuse;
- There is no safeguard against selective buybacks;
- Pricing provisions and safeguards are deemed to be unreasonable in light of market practice.

### **Reissuance of Repurchased Shares**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on requests to reissue any repurchased shares unless there is clear evidence of abuse of this authority in the past.

### **Capitalization of Reserves for Bonus Issues/Increase in Par Value**

Vote FOR requests to capitalize reserves for bonus issues of shares or to increase par value.

## **6. Other**

### **Reorganizations/Restructurings**

Vote reorganizations and restructurings on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### **Mergers and Acquisitions**

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following based on publicly available information:

- Valuation;
- Market reaction;
- Strategic rationale;
- Management's track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions;
- Presence of conflicts of interest; and
- Governance profile of the combined company.

### **Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers**

Vote proposals to waive mandatory takeover bid requirements on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### **Antitakeover Mechanisms**

Generally vote AGAINST all antitakeover proposals, unless they are structured in such a way that they give shareholders the ultimate decision on any proposal or offer.

### **Reincorporation Proposals**

Vote reincorporation proposals on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### **Expansion of Business Activities**

Vote FOR resolutions to expand business activities unless the new business takes the company into inappropriately risky areas.

### **Related-Party Transactions**

Vote related-party transactions on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

## **7. Environmental, climate change and social issues**

Vote FOR proposals that would improve the company's corporate governance or business profile at a reasonable cost.

### **Labor and Human Rights Standards**

Generally vote FOR proposals requesting a report on company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies unless such information is already publicly disclosed.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to implement company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies, considering:

- The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed;
- Whether or not existing relevant policies are consistent with internationally recognized standards;

- Whether company facilities and those of its suppliers are monitored and how;
- Company participation in fair labor organizations or other internationally recognized human rights initiatives;
- Scope and nature of business conducted in markets known to have higher risk of workplace labor/human rights abuse;
- Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights at the company or its suppliers;
- The scope of the request; and
- Deviation from industry sector peer company standards and practices.

### **Sustainability and climate change reporting**

Generally vote FOR proposals requesting the company to report on its policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms related to social, economic, and environmental sustainability, or how the company may be impacted by climate change. The following factors will be considered:

- The company's current level of publicly-available disclosure including if the company already discloses similar information through existing reports or policies such as an Environment, Health, and Safety (EHS) report; a comprehensive Code of Corporate Conduct; and/or a Diversity Report or other similar report;
- If the company has formally committed to the implementation of a reporting program based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines or a similar standard within a specified time frame;
- If the company's current level of disclosure is comparable to that of its industry peers; and
- If there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company's environmental performance.